General Zais Speech - Hoax or Hack
Got this in email.... read it then see my comments below
UPDATE: I contacted the General - he confirmed that it is real. Too bad. My analysis stands. Got some good input from an Army Colonel friend. His view - opposing mine - contained so good insights. Will post more later.
US Strategy in Iraq
Honors Convocation
Newberry College
9 November 2006
Mitchell Zais
Many of our faculty and staff have asked me my views about the current situation in Iraq. A few students have also asked. So I thought I would take this opportunity, two days before Veterans’ Day, to provide you with some insights as seen from the perspective of a combat veteran who served as the Commanding General of US and allied forces in Iraq. I also served as Chief of War Plans in the Pentagon and have spent considerable time studying national security affairs, including a fellowship at the National Defense University. So while it’s true that everyone has opinions about Iraq, I would argue that not all of those opinions are equally well-informed.
This talk will address our strategy in Iraq. I won’t talk about what the next steps should be, what the long-term prospects for peace in Iraq are, or how we can best get out of the quagmire we are in. Those might be other talks. For today I’m going to focus on strategy
Let me begin by saying that most of our problems in Iraq stem from a flawed strategy that has been in place since the beginning of the war.
It’s important that you understand what strategy is. In military terminology there is a distinction between strategy, operations, tactics, and techniques.
Strategy pertains to national decision-making at the highest level. For example, our strategy in World War II was to mobilize the nation, then defeat the Nazi regime while conducting a holding action in the Pacific, then shift our forces to destroy the Japanese Empire. Afterwards, our strategy was to rebuild both defeated nations into capitalistic democracies in order to make them future allies.
An example of an operational decision from World War II would be the decision to invade North Africa and then Italy and Southern France before moving directly for the heart of Germany by coming ashore in Northern France or Belgium.
Tactics characterize a scheme of maneuver that integrates the different capabilities of, for example, infantry, armor, and artillery.
A technique might describe a way of employing machine guns with overlapping fields of fire or of setting up a roadblock.
Our strategy in Iraq has been:
1. fight the war on the cheap;
2. ask the ground forces to perform missions that are more suitably performed by other branches of the American government;
3. inconvenience the American people as little as possible, and
4. continue to fund the Air Force and Navy at the same levels that they have been funded at for the last 30 years while shortchanging the Army and Marines who are doing all of the fighting.
No wonder the war is not going well.
Let me explain how the war is being fought on the cheap.
From the very beginning, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who thankfully announced his departure yesterday, has striven to minimize the number of soldiers and Marines in Iraq. Instead of employing the Colin Powell doctrine of “use massive force at the beginning to achieve a quick and decisive victory,” his goal has been “use no more troops than absolutely necessary so we can spend defense dollars on new technology.”
Before hostilities began, the Army Chief of Staff, Eric Shinseki, testified before Congress that an occupation of Iraq would require hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Shinseki made his estimate based on his extensive experience in the former Yugoslavia where he worked to disengage the warring factions of Orthodox Serbians, Catholic Croatians, and Muslim Kosovars.
Shinseki also had available the results of a wargame conducted in 1999 that involved 70 military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials. This recently declassified study concluded that 400,000 troops on the ground were needed to keep order, seal borders, and take care of other security needs. And even then stability would not be guaranteed.
Because of his testimony before Congress, Rumsfeld moved Shinseki aside. In a nearly unprecedented move, to replace Shinseki, Rumsfeld recalled from active duty a retired general who was more likely to accept his theory that we could win a war in Iraq and establish a stable government with a small number of troops.
The Defense Department has fought the war on the cheap because, despite overwhelming evidence that the Army and Marine Corps need a significant increase in their size in order to accomplished their assigned missions, the civilian officials who run the Pentagon have refused to request authorization from Congress to do so. Two Democratic representatives, Mark Udall from Colorado and Ellen Tauscher of California, have introduced a bill into Congress that would add 80,000 troops to the end-strength of the active Army. Currently, this bill has no support from the Defense Department.
When I was commissioned in 1969 the Army was one and a half million. Despite the fact that we're engaged in combat in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the Philippines, and committed to peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai, and on operational deployments in over 70 countries, our Army is now less than one third that size. We had more soldiers in Saudi Arabia in the first Gulf war than we have in the entire Army today. In fact, Wal-Mart has three times as many employees as the American Army has soldiers.
As late as 1990, Army end-strength was approximately 770,000. With fewer than a half-million today, defense analysts have argued that we need to add nearly 200,000 soldiers to the active ranks.
Today, the Army is so bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq that fewer than 10,000 soldiers are ready and able to deal with any new crisis elsewhere in the world. And because the Army is so small, after only a year at home units are returning to Iraq for a second and even a third 12-month tour of duty.
Let me add a parenthetical note here explaining a difference between our services. Army tours of duty in Iraq are for 12 or 13 months. For Marines it's normally six months. For Air Force personnel it's typically four months. So when a soldier says he's going back to Iraq for his third tour, it means something totally different than when an airman says the same thing.
Because the active force is too small, the mission of our National Guard and reserve forces has been changed. Their original purpose was to save the nation in time of peril. Today they serve as fillers for an inadequately sized active force. This change in mission has occurred with no national debate and no input from Congress.
We have fought the war on the cheap because we have never adequately funded the rebuilding of the Iraqi military or the training and equipping of the Iraqi police forces. The e-mails I receive from soldiers and Marines assigned to train Iraqi forces all complain of their inadequate resources because they are at the very bottom of the supply chain and the lowest priority.
We have fought the war on the cheap because we have failed to purchase necessary equipment for our troops or repair that which has been broken or a worn out in combat. You’ve all read the stories about soldiers having to purchase their own bulletproof vests and other equipment. And the Army Chief of Staff has testified that he needs an extra $17 billion to fix equipment. For example, nearly 1500 war-fighting vehicles await repair in Texas with 500 tanks sitting in Alabama.
Finally, we are fighting this war on the cheap because our defense budget of 3.8% of gross domestic product is too small. In the Kennedy administration it averaged 9% of GDP. The average defense budget in the post Vietnam era, from 1974 to 1994, was about 5.8% of GDP. If we are in a global war against radical Islam, and we are, then we need a defense budget that reflects wartime requirements.
A second part of our strategy is to ask the military to perform missions that are more appropriate for other branches of government.
Our Army and Marine Corps are taking the lead in such projects as building roads and sewage treatment plants, establishing schools, training a neutral judiciary, and developing a modern banking system. The press refers to these activities as nation-building. Our soldiers and Marines are neither equipped nor trained to do these things. They attempt them, and in general they succeed, because they are so committed and so obedient. But it is not what they do well and what only they alone can do.
But I would ask, where are our Department of Energy and Department of Transportation in restoring Iraqi infrastructure? What's the role of our Department of Education in rebuilding an Iraqi educational system? What does our Department of Justice do to help stand up an impartial judicial system? Where is the US Information Agency in establishing a modern equivalent of Radio Free Europe? And why did it take a year after the end of the active fighting for the State Department to assume responsibility from the Department of Defense in setting up an Iraqi government? These other US government agencies are only peripherally and secondarily involved in Iraq.
Actually, it would be inaccurate to say that the American government is at war. The U.S. Army is at war. The Marine Corps is at war. And other small elements of our armed forces are at war. But our government is not.
A third part of our strategy is to inconvenience the American people as little as possible.
Ask yourself, are you at war? What tangible effect is this war having on your daily life? What sacrifices have you been asked to make for the sake of this war other than being inconvenienced at airports? No, America is not a war. Only a small number of young, brave, patriotic men and women, who bear the burden of fighting and dying, are at war.
A fourth aspect of our strategy is to fund Navy and Air Force budgets at prewar levels while shortchanging the Marine Corps and the Army that are doing the fighting.
This strategy, of spending billions on technology for a Navy and Air Force that face no threat, contributes mightily to our failures in Iraq.
Secretary Rumsfeld is a former Navy pilot. His view of the battlefield is from 10,000 feet, antiseptic and surgical. Since coming into office he has funded the Air Force and the Navy at the expense of the Army and Marines because he believes technological leaps we’ll render ground forces obsolete. He assumed that the rapid victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan confirmed this belief.
For example, the Defense Department is pouring billions into buying the newest fighter aircraft, at $360 million each, to take on a non-existent enemy Air Force.
But, for pilots like Rumsfeld, war is all about technology. It’s computers, it’s radar, and it’s high tech weapons. Technologists have a hard time comprehending the motivations of a suicide bomber or a mother who celebrates the death of her son in such a way. It's difficult for them to understand that to overcome centuries of ethnic hatred and murder it will take more than one generation. It's hard for them to accept that for young men with little education, no wives or children, and few job prospects, war against the West is the only thing that gives meaning to their lives.
But war on the ground is not conducted with technology. It is fought by 25-year-old sergeants leading 19-year-old soldiers carrying rifles, in a dangerous and alien environment, where you can't tell combatants from noncombatants, Shiites from Sunnis, or suicide bombers from freedom seeking Iraqis. This means war on the street is neither antiseptic nor surgical. It's dirty, complicated, and fraught with confusion and error.
In essence, our strategy has been produced my men whose view of war is based on their understanding of technology and machinery, not their knowledge of men from an alien culture and the forces which motivate them. They fail to appreciate that if you want to hold and pacify a hostile land and a hostile people you need soldiers and Marines on the ground and in the mud, and lots of them.
In summary, our flawed strategy in Iraq has produced the situation we now face. This strategy is a product of the Pentagon, not the White House. And remember, the Pentagon is run by civilian appointees in suits, not military men and women in uniform. From the very beginning Defense Department officials failed to appreciate what it would take to win this war.
The US military has tried to support this strategy because they are trained and instructed to be subordinate to and obedient to civilian leadership. And the American people want it that way. The last thing you want is a uniformed military accustomed to debating in public the orders of their appointed civilian masters. But retired generals and admirals are starting to speak out, to criticize the strategy that has produced our current situation in Iraq.
But, if we continue to fight the war on the cheap, if we continue to avoid involving the American people by asking them to make any sacrifice at all, if we continue to spend our dollars on technology while neglecting the soldiers and Marines on the ground, and if we fail to involve the full scope of the American government in rebuilding Iraq, then we might as well quit, and come home. But, what we have now is not a real strategy – it’s business as usual.
Commentary:
Some interesting points, but the article is a bit fishy.... I think it's been doctored... here's why.. the text says "combat veteran who served as the Commanding General of US and allied forces in Iraq. I also served as Chief of War Plans in the Pentagon and have spent considerable time studying national security affairs, including a fellowship at the National Defense University. "
That's quite a resume. Also quite misleading. Surprising if that's really how he wrote it. BGen Zais combat experience is as a rifle platoon leader in Vietnam. He was a research fellow at Nat'l Defense Univ in 1990, followed by a garrison tour as chief of operations, planning, training and budgeting at Fort Ord, Calif., from 1990 to 1992, and brigade commander there from 1992 to 1993. Note that most of the Army was deployed for Desert Storm from 90-91.
He was Chief of Plans in the Pentagon from 1993 to 1994 Chief of Strategic Plans... While that's a huge deal, it's management - not war planning. This would however, provide a good perspective to make the author's arguments about force composition and budgets.
He was commander of CJTF-Kuwait in 1998, but that is a far cry from "Commanding General of US and allied forces in Iraq"....
The Brigadier General retired from active duty in 2000.
Like I said, I'm not sure this is his speech. .. but if it is, he's deliberately misleading the reader about his qualifications.
As far as his arguments... I'm not really sure what the conclusion is supposed to be. He defines four strategies of how we're fighting the war - (the author here confuses policy with strategy, another indicator that this may be a bogus document). Buts let's assume that he has correctly defined the administration's strategies, an arguable proposition at best. Nowhere does he outline alternative strategies or demonstrate why the existing "strategy" has failed. Fine trait for an academic, but unexpected in a flag officer who had to lead real troops.
He comments that "...Instead of employing the Colin Powell doctrine of “use massive force at the beginning to achieve a quick and decisive victory,” ...
In reality, in three weeks in 2003 we destroyed the enemy military and removed Saddam from power. That was the primary objective. It was achieved. The failure was the post war planning and execution for occupying the country. (For an speech on strategy, he throws the word "goal" in here when talking about doctrine... another sign of either a hoax or intellectual sloppiness. I'm not familiar with the general's research, but for a strategic planner and an academic, that type of sloppiness would be surprising.)
I'll give some brief comments on his points .
"fight the war on the cheap;" I agree with the assessment that we're fighting on the cheap, but disagree with the implication that raising more troops and spending more money would lead to quicker victory. That may work against Soviet tanks. But it didn't apply in Vietnam and it doesn't apply in assymetric warfare where information dominance just as important as boots on the ground. Case in point - we have won every battle fought in Afghanistan and Iraq - metal on metal - we have plenty of troops, We took Fallujah - a city of 300,000. A city. The largest scale urban combat since WWII. Our brave Marines took Fallujah in three weeks - destroying over a thousand enemy while suffering fewer than 200 dead. Hardly an argument that we are underequipped. Where we have lost ground is in the information war - head choppers, Abu Ghraib, Koran toilet flushing, IED videos on the web. He doesn't mention that the Army explicitly and reasonably refers to this as "the long war" Given the idea that we're in for a long war - which would you prefer - a long war fought on the cheap or a long war that sucks down almost 10% of GDP each year?
ask the ground forces to perform missions that are more suitably performed by other branches of the American government;
this is a red herring. While a lot of troops are engaged in civil affairs, the fact is that most of the "nation building" operations have not been handled by the active forces, they've been contracted out. That's been the policy. It hasn't worked very well, but I would argue that contractors are better equipped than "the American government" to build roads and power grids. In fact, don't contractors actually do the work here? Is this another sign of a bogus document?
"inconvenience the American people as little as possible" I will tell you first hand, military folks are conflicted about this. I remember coming back to the US after flying westmeds off Lebanon during the war in 1982 and 1983 and wanting to shake people, "Don't you know what's going on?" but with age I've come to accept, and many other military folks accept, that the military are guardians of our way of life. That way of life means safety and security. If people were worried about the day-to-day dangers then our military (and political leaders) has failed us. If you think you should be doing more, do it. Plenty do - they send packages, write letters, greet troops at the airport, they join the armed forces. Others don't. They're free to do that too, just don't undermine or belittle those who have chosen to sacrifice.
continue to fund the Air Force and Navy at the same levels that they have been funded at for the last 30 years while shortchanging the Army and Marines who are doing all of the fighting. A quick look at some real data shows that this is simply not true. In constant dollars, the Navy at the end of the Cold War had an annual budget of $139B... it declined thoughout the 1990's then started increasing again after 9/11. The FY2005 budget was $119B, still $20B less than it's high point 15years ago http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/fmb/05pres/databook/SEC4/4_5.pdf As far as the argument that Rumsfeld is a technology guy... yes. But I think Afghanistan and the inital Iraq campaign validated that approach. He also cut some pretty significant programs (Commanche and Crusader) in late stage acquisition. These expensive high tech efforts were supplanted by GPS artillery (Excaliber) and UAVs. A huge savings.
The last thing that caught my eye (and there are others I haven't bothered to point out) was the comment The US military has tried to support this strategy because they are trained and instructed to be subordinate to and obedient to civilian leadership. While the military is subordinate to civilian leadership, thanks to our constitution.... "trained and instructed to be .... obedient..." sounds a bit more like puppy training than words I would expect from a flag officer.
To wrap this up, the writers says...."So while it’s true that everyone has opinions about Iraq, I would argue that not all of those opinions are equally well-informed."
I would agree.
For another perspective, take a look at Maggie's Farm.
Got this in email.... read it then see my comments below
UPDATE: I contacted the General - he confirmed that it is real. Too bad. My analysis stands. Got some good input from an Army Colonel friend. His view - opposing mine - contained so good insights. Will post more later.
US Strategy in Iraq
Honors Convocation
Newberry College
9 November 2006
Mitchell Zais
Many of our faculty and staff have asked me my views about the current situation in Iraq. A few students have also asked. So I thought I would take this opportunity, two days before Veterans’ Day, to provide you with some insights as seen from the perspective of a combat veteran who served as the Commanding General of US and allied forces in Iraq. I also served as Chief of War Plans in the Pentagon and have spent considerable time studying national security affairs, including a fellowship at the National Defense University. So while it’s true that everyone has opinions about Iraq, I would argue that not all of those opinions are equally well-informed.
This talk will address our strategy in Iraq. I won’t talk about what the next steps should be, what the long-term prospects for peace in Iraq are, or how we can best get out of the quagmire we are in. Those might be other talks. For today I’m going to focus on strategy
Let me begin by saying that most of our problems in Iraq stem from a flawed strategy that has been in place since the beginning of the war.
It’s important that you understand what strategy is. In military terminology there is a distinction between strategy, operations, tactics, and techniques.
Strategy pertains to national decision-making at the highest level. For example, our strategy in World War II was to mobilize the nation, then defeat the Nazi regime while conducting a holding action in the Pacific, then shift our forces to destroy the Japanese Empire. Afterwards, our strategy was to rebuild both defeated nations into capitalistic democracies in order to make them future allies.
An example of an operational decision from World War II would be the decision to invade North Africa and then Italy and Southern France before moving directly for the heart of Germany by coming ashore in Northern France or Belgium.
Tactics characterize a scheme of maneuver that integrates the different capabilities of, for example, infantry, armor, and artillery.
A technique might describe a way of employing machine guns with overlapping fields of fire or of setting up a roadblock.
Our strategy in Iraq has been:
1. fight the war on the cheap;
2. ask the ground forces to perform missions that are more suitably performed by other branches of the American government;
3. inconvenience the American people as little as possible, and
4. continue to fund the Air Force and Navy at the same levels that they have been funded at for the last 30 years while shortchanging the Army and Marines who are doing all of the fighting.
No wonder the war is not going well.
Let me explain how the war is being fought on the cheap.
From the very beginning, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who thankfully announced his departure yesterday, has striven to minimize the number of soldiers and Marines in Iraq. Instead of employing the Colin Powell doctrine of “use massive force at the beginning to achieve a quick and decisive victory,” his goal has been “use no more troops than absolutely necessary so we can spend defense dollars on new technology.”
Before hostilities began, the Army Chief of Staff, Eric Shinseki, testified before Congress that an occupation of Iraq would require hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Shinseki made his estimate based on his extensive experience in the former Yugoslavia where he worked to disengage the warring factions of Orthodox Serbians, Catholic Croatians, and Muslim Kosovars.
Shinseki also had available the results of a wargame conducted in 1999 that involved 70 military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials. This recently declassified study concluded that 400,000 troops on the ground were needed to keep order, seal borders, and take care of other security needs. And even then stability would not be guaranteed.
Because of his testimony before Congress, Rumsfeld moved Shinseki aside. In a nearly unprecedented move, to replace Shinseki, Rumsfeld recalled from active duty a retired general who was more likely to accept his theory that we could win a war in Iraq and establish a stable government with a small number of troops.
The Defense Department has fought the war on the cheap because, despite overwhelming evidence that the Army and Marine Corps need a significant increase in their size in order to accomplished their assigned missions, the civilian officials who run the Pentagon have refused to request authorization from Congress to do so. Two Democratic representatives, Mark Udall from Colorado and Ellen Tauscher of California, have introduced a bill into Congress that would add 80,000 troops to the end-strength of the active Army. Currently, this bill has no support from the Defense Department.
When I was commissioned in 1969 the Army was one and a half million. Despite the fact that we're engaged in combat in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the Philippines, and committed to peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai, and on operational deployments in over 70 countries, our Army is now less than one third that size. We had more soldiers in Saudi Arabia in the first Gulf war than we have in the entire Army today. In fact, Wal-Mart has three times as many employees as the American Army has soldiers.
As late as 1990, Army end-strength was approximately 770,000. With fewer than a half-million today, defense analysts have argued that we need to add nearly 200,000 soldiers to the active ranks.
Today, the Army is so bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq that fewer than 10,000 soldiers are ready and able to deal with any new crisis elsewhere in the world. And because the Army is so small, after only a year at home units are returning to Iraq for a second and even a third 12-month tour of duty.
Let me add a parenthetical note here explaining a difference between our services. Army tours of duty in Iraq are for 12 or 13 months. For Marines it's normally six months. For Air Force personnel it's typically four months. So when a soldier says he's going back to Iraq for his third tour, it means something totally different than when an airman says the same thing.
Because the active force is too small, the mission of our National Guard and reserve forces has been changed. Their original purpose was to save the nation in time of peril. Today they serve as fillers for an inadequately sized active force. This change in mission has occurred with no national debate and no input from Congress.
We have fought the war on the cheap because we have never adequately funded the rebuilding of the Iraqi military or the training and equipping of the Iraqi police forces. The e-mails I receive from soldiers and Marines assigned to train Iraqi forces all complain of their inadequate resources because they are at the very bottom of the supply chain and the lowest priority.
We have fought the war on the cheap because we have failed to purchase necessary equipment for our troops or repair that which has been broken or a worn out in combat. You’ve all read the stories about soldiers having to purchase their own bulletproof vests and other equipment. And the Army Chief of Staff has testified that he needs an extra $17 billion to fix equipment. For example, nearly 1500 war-fighting vehicles await repair in Texas with 500 tanks sitting in Alabama.
Finally, we are fighting this war on the cheap because our defense budget of 3.8% of gross domestic product is too small. In the Kennedy administration it averaged 9% of GDP. The average defense budget in the post Vietnam era, from 1974 to 1994, was about 5.8% of GDP. If we are in a global war against radical Islam, and we are, then we need a defense budget that reflects wartime requirements.
A second part of our strategy is to ask the military to perform missions that are more appropriate for other branches of government.
Our Army and Marine Corps are taking the lead in such projects as building roads and sewage treatment plants, establishing schools, training a neutral judiciary, and developing a modern banking system. The press refers to these activities as nation-building. Our soldiers and Marines are neither equipped nor trained to do these things. They attempt them, and in general they succeed, because they are so committed and so obedient. But it is not what they do well and what only they alone can do.
But I would ask, where are our Department of Energy and Department of Transportation in restoring Iraqi infrastructure? What's the role of our Department of Education in rebuilding an Iraqi educational system? What does our Department of Justice do to help stand up an impartial judicial system? Where is the US Information Agency in establishing a modern equivalent of Radio Free Europe? And why did it take a year after the end of the active fighting for the State Department to assume responsibility from the Department of Defense in setting up an Iraqi government? These other US government agencies are only peripherally and secondarily involved in Iraq.
Actually, it would be inaccurate to say that the American government is at war. The U.S. Army is at war. The Marine Corps is at war. And other small elements of our armed forces are at war. But our government is not.
A third part of our strategy is to inconvenience the American people as little as possible.
Ask yourself, are you at war? What tangible effect is this war having on your daily life? What sacrifices have you been asked to make for the sake of this war other than being inconvenienced at airports? No, America is not a war. Only a small number of young, brave, patriotic men and women, who bear the burden of fighting and dying, are at war.
A fourth aspect of our strategy is to fund Navy and Air Force budgets at prewar levels while shortchanging the Marine Corps and the Army that are doing the fighting.
This strategy, of spending billions on technology for a Navy and Air Force that face no threat, contributes mightily to our failures in Iraq.
Secretary Rumsfeld is a former Navy pilot. His view of the battlefield is from 10,000 feet, antiseptic and surgical. Since coming into office he has funded the Air Force and the Navy at the expense of the Army and Marines because he believes technological leaps we’ll render ground forces obsolete. He assumed that the rapid victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan confirmed this belief.
For example, the Defense Department is pouring billions into buying the newest fighter aircraft, at $360 million each, to take on a non-existent enemy Air Force.
But, for pilots like Rumsfeld, war is all about technology. It’s computers, it’s radar, and it’s high tech weapons. Technologists have a hard time comprehending the motivations of a suicide bomber or a mother who celebrates the death of her son in such a way. It's difficult for them to understand that to overcome centuries of ethnic hatred and murder it will take more than one generation. It's hard for them to accept that for young men with little education, no wives or children, and few job prospects, war against the West is the only thing that gives meaning to their lives.
But war on the ground is not conducted with technology. It is fought by 25-year-old sergeants leading 19-year-old soldiers carrying rifles, in a dangerous and alien environment, where you can't tell combatants from noncombatants, Shiites from Sunnis, or suicide bombers from freedom seeking Iraqis. This means war on the street is neither antiseptic nor surgical. It's dirty, complicated, and fraught with confusion and error.
In essence, our strategy has been produced my men whose view of war is based on their understanding of technology and machinery, not their knowledge of men from an alien culture and the forces which motivate them. They fail to appreciate that if you want to hold and pacify a hostile land and a hostile people you need soldiers and Marines on the ground and in the mud, and lots of them.
In summary, our flawed strategy in Iraq has produced the situation we now face. This strategy is a product of the Pentagon, not the White House. And remember, the Pentagon is run by civilian appointees in suits, not military men and women in uniform. From the very beginning Defense Department officials failed to appreciate what it would take to win this war.
The US military has tried to support this strategy because they are trained and instructed to be subordinate to and obedient to civilian leadership. And the American people want it that way. The last thing you want is a uniformed military accustomed to debating in public the orders of their appointed civilian masters. But retired generals and admirals are starting to speak out, to criticize the strategy that has produced our current situation in Iraq.
But, if we continue to fight the war on the cheap, if we continue to avoid involving the American people by asking them to make any sacrifice at all, if we continue to spend our dollars on technology while neglecting the soldiers and Marines on the ground, and if we fail to involve the full scope of the American government in rebuilding Iraq, then we might as well quit, and come home. But, what we have now is not a real strategy – it’s business as usual.
Commentary:
Some interesting points, but the article is a bit fishy.... I think it's been doctored... here's why.. the text says "combat veteran who served as the Commanding General of US and allied forces in Iraq. I also served as Chief of War Plans in the Pentagon and have spent considerable time studying national security affairs, including a fellowship at the National Defense University. "
That's quite a resume. Also quite misleading. Surprising if that's really how he wrote it. BGen Zais combat experience is as a rifle platoon leader in Vietnam. He was a research fellow at Nat'l Defense Univ in 1990, followed by a garrison tour as chief of operations, planning, training and budgeting at Fort Ord, Calif., from 1990 to 1992, and brigade commander there from 1992 to 1993. Note that most of the Army was deployed for Desert Storm from 90-91.
He was Chief of Plans in the Pentagon from 1993 to 1994 Chief of Strategic Plans... While that's a huge deal, it's management - not war planning. This would however, provide a good perspective to make the author's arguments about force composition and budgets.
He was commander of CJTF-Kuwait in 1998, but that is a far cry from "Commanding General of US and allied forces in Iraq"....
The Brigadier General retired from active duty in 2000.
Like I said, I'm not sure this is his speech. .. but if it is, he's deliberately misleading the reader about his qualifications.
As far as his arguments... I'm not really sure what the conclusion is supposed to be. He defines four strategies of how we're fighting the war - (the author here confuses policy with strategy, another indicator that this may be a bogus document). Buts let's assume that he has correctly defined the administration's strategies, an arguable proposition at best. Nowhere does he outline alternative strategies or demonstrate why the existing "strategy" has failed. Fine trait for an academic, but unexpected in a flag officer who had to lead real troops.
He comments that "...Instead of employing the Colin Powell doctrine of “use massive force at the beginning to achieve a quick and decisive victory,” ...
In reality, in three weeks in 2003 we destroyed the enemy military and removed Saddam from power. That was the primary objective. It was achieved. The failure was the post war planning and execution for occupying the country. (For an speech on strategy, he throws the word "goal" in here when talking about doctrine... another sign of either a hoax or intellectual sloppiness. I'm not familiar with the general's research, but for a strategic planner and an academic, that type of sloppiness would be surprising.)
I'll give some brief comments on his points .
"fight the war on the cheap;" I agree with the assessment that we're fighting on the cheap, but disagree with the implication that raising more troops and spending more money would lead to quicker victory. That may work against Soviet tanks. But it didn't apply in Vietnam and it doesn't apply in assymetric warfare where information dominance just as important as boots on the ground. Case in point - we have won every battle fought in Afghanistan and Iraq - metal on metal - we have plenty of troops, We took Fallujah - a city of 300,000. A city. The largest scale urban combat since WWII. Our brave Marines took Fallujah in three weeks - destroying over a thousand enemy while suffering fewer than 200 dead. Hardly an argument that we are underequipped. Where we have lost ground is in the information war - head choppers, Abu Ghraib, Koran toilet flushing, IED videos on the web. He doesn't mention that the Army explicitly and reasonably refers to this as "the long war" Given the idea that we're in for a long war - which would you prefer - a long war fought on the cheap or a long war that sucks down almost 10% of GDP each year?
ask the ground forces to perform missions that are more suitably performed by other branches of the American government;
this is a red herring. While a lot of troops are engaged in civil affairs, the fact is that most of the "nation building" operations have not been handled by the active forces, they've been contracted out. That's been the policy. It hasn't worked very well, but I would argue that contractors are better equipped than "the American government" to build roads and power grids. In fact, don't contractors actually do the work here? Is this another sign of a bogus document?
"inconvenience the American people as little as possible" I will tell you first hand, military folks are conflicted about this. I remember coming back to the US after flying westmeds off Lebanon during the war in 1982 and 1983 and wanting to shake people, "Don't you know what's going on?" but with age I've come to accept, and many other military folks accept, that the military are guardians of our way of life. That way of life means safety and security. If people were worried about the day-to-day dangers then our military (and political leaders) has failed us. If you think you should be doing more, do it. Plenty do - they send packages, write letters, greet troops at the airport, they join the armed forces. Others don't. They're free to do that too, just don't undermine or belittle those who have chosen to sacrifice.
continue to fund the Air Force and Navy at the same levels that they have been funded at for the last 30 years while shortchanging the Army and Marines who are doing all of the fighting. A quick look at some real data shows that this is simply not true. In constant dollars, the Navy at the end of the Cold War had an annual budget of $139B... it declined thoughout the 1990's then started increasing again after 9/11. The FY2005 budget was $119B, still $20B less than it's high point 15years ago http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/fmb/05pres/databook/SEC4/4_5.pdf As far as the argument that Rumsfeld is a technology guy... yes. But I think Afghanistan and the inital Iraq campaign validated that approach. He also cut some pretty significant programs (Commanche and Crusader) in late stage acquisition. These expensive high tech efforts were supplanted by GPS artillery (Excaliber) and UAVs. A huge savings.
The last thing that caught my eye (and there are others I haven't bothered to point out) was the comment The US military has tried to support this strategy because they are trained and instructed to be subordinate to and obedient to civilian leadership. While the military is subordinate to civilian leadership, thanks to our constitution.... "trained and instructed to be .... obedient..." sounds a bit more like puppy training than words I would expect from a flag officer.
To wrap this up, the writers says...."So while it’s true that everyone has opinions about Iraq, I would argue that not all of those opinions are equally well-informed."
I would agree.
For another perspective, take a look at Maggie's Farm.
posted by FOD at
7:34 PM
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